If this new executive order had been what was was signed initially—combined with the normal interagency process and briefing of border officials as to how to implement it—President Trump wouldn’t have provoked the type of political response he did or the legal quagmire he entered. This order is much more narrowly tailored, providing exemptions not just to those with green cards and other valid visas, but also people with significant contacts to United States, students, children, urgent medical cases, and other special circumstances—and Iraq is necessarily treated as a special case—as well as spelling out reasons for the remaining restrictions.
As it stands now, the tweaks in the new executive order would normally put these actions firmly within the executive’s authority under the relevant immigration laws: presidents have broad discretion over refugee programs and to suspend entry of certain classes of foreigners on national security grounds. But, in large part due to the botched development and implementation of the previous order, this isn’t the normal case and courts will likely be less deferential to assertions of executive power here than they would otherwise be.
And then there are the atmospherics of what so many people consider to be a “Muslim ban.” Just because a presidential candidate uses hyperbolic language during a campaign—or his surrogates use similarly inartful language on national TV—doesn’t mean that any policy in that area is constitutionally suspect, but some judges will surely see it that way.
Finally, all that’s before getting into the wisdom of this policy. Refugees generally aren’t a security threat, for example, and it’s unclear whether vetting or visa-issuing procedures in the six remaining targeted countries represent the biggest weakness in our border defenses or ability to prevent terrorism on American soil.
This piece was originally published at Cato at Liberty.